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Overview: Only an out-of-court statement (OCS) offered for TOMA = hearsay (HS). The
Confrontation Clause applies only to “testimonial” HS.
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Chart 1 FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION
I. ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

Is an OCS of a person being proved?

No (either not an OCS or not by a
person): not HS (Rule 5-801).
See Chart 2.

Yes (then it might be HS evidence (EVI). The person
who made the OCS is the Out-of-Court Declarant.
Even a witness on the stand is an Out-of-Court
Declarant if she is testifying to her own OCS.

For what purpose is the proponent of the
EVI offering it? Is that purpose relevant to
an issue in the case?

No (inadmissible: Rule 5-402).

Yes

In ordernot
for the EVI offered toexclude
help to the
prove
EVIor disprove
the relevant fact as to which it is offered, must the factfinder rely on the truthfulness/accuracy of a fact that was
asserted by the Out-of-Court Declarant?

No: Not HS; the HS Rule does
not exclude the EVI. See Chart 3.

Yes

Does the EVI fall within an exception to the hearsay rule
(Rules 5-802.1, 5-803, & 5-804)? (Have all of the
foundation elements for that exception been proved to
the judge’s satisfaction by a preponderance of the
evidence [Rule 5-104(a)]?) See Chart 6.

No (inadmissible HS: Rule 5-802).

Yes: The HS rule
No does
not exclude the EVI.
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Does any other specific rule of
evidence or privilege exclude the
EVI?

Yes; inadmissible under another rule (e.g., 5-404
through 5-412) or a privilege. If, for example, the
OCS was made in a compromise negotiation, Rule
5-408 excludes it.

No

Should the trial judge exercise his
or her discretion to exclude the
EVI under Rule 5-403?

Yes: Inadmissible because of substantial risk of
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

No

II. THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES! BUT DOES
THE CONSITITUTION EXCLUDE IT?
A. Confrontation Clause Overview
Is the EVI being offered (1)
No:
against a criminal accused AND
(2) at a trial on the merits?

Yes

Is the EVI “testimonial hearsay?”
See Chart 4.

Yes

No: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it.

No: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Davis v.
Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).
UNLESS the EVI is based on the testimonial
HS of a Declarant as to whom the defendant’s
confrontation right is not met. Derr v. State, 422
Md. 211 (2011).
PENDING CASE: Williams v. Illinois (U.S.
No. 10-8505) raises this question for the content
of DNA analysis by Cellmark of a vaginal swab
from the victim, relied on under Fed. R. Evid.
703 and compared by the testifying expert to her
own DNA analysis of the defendant’s blood
sample. (Illinois would distinguish Bullcoming.)
4

Is the HS Declarant present and subject to
cross-exam?

Yes: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); Lawson v State, 389 Md. 570
(2005).

No

No. Confron. Cl. excludes EVI unless
accused forfeited confron. right. See Chart
5.

Is the declarant unavailable to testify (Rule 5804(a)?

Yes

Did the accused have an earlier
opportunity to cross-examine the
Declarant about the OCS?

Yes. Confron. Cl. does not exclude EVI.

No

EVI is excluded unless accused
FORFEITED confron. right. See Chart 5.
B. If the Confrontation Clause Does Not Exclude the Evidence because the Hearsay
is Nontestimonial, the Only Remaining Constitutional Safeguard Is the Due Process
Clause.
Due process requires that a verdict not be based on unreliable hearsay.
Lower appellate courts have therefore continued to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US. 56 (1980) to
evaluate the fact-finder’s reliance on nontestimonial hearsay. Dictum in Michigan v. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2011), supports this position.
Under Roberts, there is no error if the nontestimonial hearsay relied upon at trial either:
(1) Qualifies under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception (probably all those listed in Title 5,
except statements against penal interest, 5-804(b)(3)); or
(2) Is shown to have had equivalent “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
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Chart 2 IS THE EVIDENCE AN “OUT OF COURT STATEMENT” (“OCS”) OF
A PERSON?
A. What is a “Statement”?
1. Rule 5-801(a) defines a “statement” as “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.”
“Statement” means an assertion of one or more facts or opinions. A statement may
be either an oral assertion, a written assertion (e.g., note or document), or conduct
intended as an assertion.
2. The statement is usually “verbal” (i.e., in words, no matter whether written or oral).
3. A “statement” also may be nonverbal assertive conduct” clearly intended as a
substitute for particular words (nodding head to say yes or no, pointing to a
person in a line-up, raising hand to indicate affirmative answer when asked, “who
would like to …?”).
4.“Statement does not include implied assertions from nonverbal nonassertive
conduct (e.g., walking down the street, putting a coat on, raising an umbrella,
even if offered to show that the person could walk, that it was cold out, or that it
was raining).
5. “Statement” may, however, include an implied assertion from an utterance in
words (if the utterance is offered to prove the truth of the assertion and has no
independent relevance as circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence.
a. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005) (Raker, J.) (“Is Erik going to get
me?” was hearsay because relevant only if taken to mean “…like he got
[killed] Calen?”).
b. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005) (Raker, J.) (hospital bill found in
residence where defendant and illegal drugs were found was inadmissible
hearsay when prosecutor argued in closing that hospital would want to be
sure it had right address so it could be paid).
Judge Greene had held, while on the Court of Special Appeals, that the evidence was
admissible nonhearsay. Judges Wilner and Battaglia, dissenting, agreed with Judge
Greene.
The dissent would have followed those cases that hold that a name and address on a
piece of mail are not intended by the writer “as an assertion,” or “not intended to
communicate the thought that the [named person] lived there,” and thus do not constitute
hearsay. Such evidence, rather, is properly admissible “as circumstantial evidence that
[the defendant] stored his property, including his correspondence,” in the place where it
6

was found, which in turn tends to prove that the defendant exercises control over that
place.
c. Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22 (2006) (D. Eyler, J.) (evidence that the name “Sat
Dogg” was displayed on a screen at a bowling alley – the crime scene was properly
admitted as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence), aff’d on other grounds,
395 Md. 758 (2006) (Raker, J.).
d. In a 5 to 2 vote in Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372 (2010)(Murphy, J.) the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in permitting a
police officer to testify that he answered the cell phone confiscated from
the defendant during his arrest, said “hello,” and “a male voice” said, “Yo,
can I get a 40.”
Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, reasoned that (1) “[w]hen a telephone is used to
receive illegal wagers or to receive orders called in by persons who wish to purchase a
controlled dangerous substance, the telephone becomes an instrumentality of the crime”
and (2) “the rule against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of the ‘verbal act’
that established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone called by
a person who requested to purchase cocaine.”
The result of admissibility reached by this decision conformed to the results obtained for
decades in the Court of Special Appeals and around the country as to similar evidence of
telephone calls placing bets or requesting drugs. The “verbal act” rationale would
differentiate the bookie-betting parlor and drug order cases like Garner from cases like
Stoddard and Bernadyn. But Garner may indicate a partial retreat from the Stoddard
majority’s approach.
The Garner majority could have affirmed under the facts there by looking at the evidence
as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that a phone connected with the
defendant received such a call, which was relevant even if the caller did not have any
apparent intention to communicate, to the person who answered the phone, the fact that
the defendant sold cocaine. This would be consistent with Judge Wilner’s concurrence
joined by Judges Greene and Battaglia in Stoddard.
If the Garner majority opinion is read as following this approach, then the evidence in
Fields also was not hearsay; nor would the evidence in Bernadyn have been hearsay if
offered for the proper, relevant, limited purpose that something with the defendant’s
name on it was found at the address where the drugs were found.
Interestingly, the Garner majority stated: “We need not either reaffirm or overrule either
of those fact-specific cases in [Stoddard or Bernadyn] in order to hold that the rule
against hearsay was not violated by Trooper Gussoni’s testimony about the telephone call
at issue [in Garner].” Judges Battaglia and Greene were in the majority in Garner, and
7

were joined by three judges who joined the court after Stoddard, Bernadyn, and Fields:
Judges Adkins, Barbera, and Murphy. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Harrell, the only two
remaining on the Court of Appeals who were in the majority in Stoddard, found
themselves alone in the dissent in Garner.
e. Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers
shown on cell phone designating missed and received calls were not assertions or
statements of a person; their relevance did not depend upon the belief or accuracy
of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of police detective to the
numbers he saw was not hearsay).
f. In Fair v. State, 198 Md. App. 1 (2011) Kenney, J.), a paycheck with the
defendant’s name on it, with a pay date of the day before a police officer testified
he found the paycheck in a car console with a handgun and underneath a bag of
marijuana, was held to have been properly admitted by the trial court” “to show
the Defendant’s possessory interest in the vehicle’….”
Relying on Garner, as well as several federal cases (including a U.S. Supreme Court
decision) holding that paychecks and money orders were not factual assertions, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the paycheck was a nonhearsay verbal act, relevant and
offered as “merely circumstantial nonassertive crime scene evidence.”
The latter part of the rationale is more intellectually appealing here, because the fact that
the paycheck bore the defendant’s name and was found in the vehicle linked someone
with that name to the vehicle, and it was offered for that limited purpose, rather than to
show that the payor owed or had paid a certain sum. If it had been offered as to the latter
purpose, and that fact had been relevant, it would have been relevant as a nonhearsay
“verbal act.”
B. When is a Statement an “Out-of-Court” Statement?
1. Rule 5-801(c) defines an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) as “a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing ….”
2. “Out-of-court” thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a
statement made by any person somewhere else at another time. The other place may
even have been another court proceeding.
3. It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT. (For hearsay
exceptions requiring that the declarant also testify at trial, see Rule 5-802.1— certain
prior inconsistent or consistent statements, prior identification of a person, prompt report
of sexual assault, and past recollection recorded.)
8

4. Why the preference for live testimony rather than out-of-court statements, even
of a declarant who is now on the stand?
a. Better evaluation of demeanor evidence;
b. Better ability to cross-examine live memory; and
c. Out-of-court statement may not have been under oath.
C. To Be Covered by the Hearsay Rule, a Statement Must Have Been Made by “a
Person
1. Rule 5-801 refers to “a person.” It does not include statements by animals –
such as a crowing rooster or a barking dog – or “statements” by machines,
because neither can be cross-examined.
Foundation evidence regarding the training of the dog or the routine maintenance of the
machines may be required, to show relevance and reliability.
2. Numbers Shown on Cell Phone for Incoming Calls was Nonhearsay.
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) Thieme, J.) (numbers shown on
cell phone designating missed and received calls were not assertions or statements of a
person; their relevance did not depend upon the belief or accuracy of the person(s) who
made the calls, and the testimony of the police detective to the numbers he saw was not
hearsay).
3.

An Important Issue in the Confrontation Clause Context

See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (J. Niemeyer)
(20 pages of data generated by Armed Forces Institute’s Forensic Toxology
Laboratory chromatograph machine and computers, showing that the defendant’s
blood sample contained ethanol and phencyclidine, were not hearsay, because the
machine performing chromatography on the defendant’s blood was not a “person”
and could not be a “declarant” under Fed. R. Evid. 801), cert. denied (U.S. 2009);
United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361-62 (7th Cir. 2008) (instruments’
readings were not statements, though expert’s conclusions based on them were),
cert. denied (U.S. 2008).
The facts of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming did not directly raise this question, because
there the evidence was not a machine printout but a certificate by a person, based on the
machine readings. See also Derr v. State, Charts 1 and 4.
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Chart 3 IS THE OCS OFFERED FOR “TOMA”?
A.

Hearsay Schemata

(1) EVI offered (determined to
include an OCS OF A PERSON)

B.

(2) MATERIAL FACT
that EVI (1) is offered
to help to prove

(3) Is the OCS offered for
TOMA?

1.

If the evidence offered includes an "OCS” of a person, it is hearsay
only if it is offered at trial to prove “TOMA.”

2.

TOMA = the truth of any fact that was being asserted by the
declarant before the trial, at the time the declarant made the out-ofcourt statement.

TOMA Analysis
The OCS is offered for TOMA if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on
something the declarant said in his/her OCS as true, accurate, correct.
The step-by-step analysis is:
1.

Who was the out-of-court declarant?

2.

What was the declarant asserting at the time he made the OCS?

3.

For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the
proponent offering the evidence at trial?

4.

How does the evidence tend to prove that fact?
Rule 5-401 relevance requires only the slightest probative value, not
necessarily persuasive probative value.

5.

If the evidence offered HELPS TO PROVE the fact as to which it is
offered, even if the out-of-court declarant was either insincere or
inaccurate, the evidence is NOT HEARSAY.
Ask, “Even if the assertions made in the OCS were incorrect, is it still
relevant that the declarant made the statement?” If the answer to this
question is yes, then the evidence is nonhearsay.
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The evidence may come in for the relevant nonhearsay purpose
(subject to exclusion under Rule 5-403). A limiting instruction should
be given upon request (Rule 5-105).
See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30 (1994) (reversible error to admit
arrestee’s hearsay statement to police that defendant was his
accomplice, for nonhearsay purpose of showing why police
included defendant’s picture in photographic array to be shown to
victim: limited probative value for that purpose was substantially
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).
Sanders v. State, 194 Md. App. 162, 179-87 (2010) (no abuse of
discretion in excluding fact that defendant made a post-Miranda
statement to police when offered by defense for nonhearsay
purpose, as it “likely would have confused the jury and caused it to
speculate why the statement was not introduced into evidence”),
vacated on other grounds, 418 Md. 368 (2011).
C.

Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is Relevant
Short of Proving TOMA
1.

Sometimes the mere fact that the OCS was made is relevant,
regardless of whether the declarant was either sincere or accurate. In
this event, a person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as
to whether the OCS was made as s/he has testified.
a. Verbal acts (a/k/a “legally operative facts”): either the substantive law
regarding the particular type of claim or defense requires that an outof-court statement have been made, e.g., defamation, contracts (including
the offer and the acceptance), wills, or gives a particular legal effect to
that type of statement (e.g., “Your money or your life!”).
These utterances are “magic words” under the substantive law; they take
the speaker to a particular legal destination. See Garner v. State and Fair
v. State, in Chart 2.
b. Statements offered to prove their effect on the hearer or reader, to
prove that the hearer or reader was put on notice, or affecting the
reasonableness of the hearer’s or reader’s subsequent conduct, e.g., “Be
careful, the floor is wet,” or, in a negligent hiring or retention case, what
the employer had been told about the employee.
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i.

Rehabilitation of an Impeached Witness by Evidence of
Threats
Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010)
(Kenney, J.), (no error in admitting State’s witness’s
testimony that he was scared and that his life had
been threatened, when witness was nervous and
made inconsistent statements, and court had given
limiting instructions that evidence was relevant only
to witness’s credibility and that there was no
evidence that defendant was involved in or knew of
the threats), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011).

ii.

Statements offered to prove why the police took certain
actions are relevant for the effect on the hearer, but are
usually excluded under Rule 5-403 when offered for this
limited purpose, due to the risk that the jury will consider
them for their truth.
Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.)
reaffirms this general principle, but found no error under
the facts there when the detective did not repeat the OCS,
but testified that, based on the victim’s, another officer’s,
and codefendant’s statements, he retrieved certain items as
associated with the alleged robbery.

c. Statements that are offered as circumstantial evidence to prove
only such matters as the declarant’s being alive, conscious
(which may be relevant, e.g., to pain and suffering), able to speak
a particular language, etc. at the time s/he made the OCS.
d. Prior statements made by the declarant, that are offered only
to impeach or rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility, but not as
substantive evidence.
i. Prior inconsistent statements of the person who is sought to be
impeached (Rules 5-613, witnesses, and 5-806, nontestifying
hearsay declarants).
See Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521 (2011) (Sharer, J.)
(defendant’s OCS, recounting witness’s OCS, was properly
admitted: defendant’s as an admission of a party opponent,
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and the OCS within it was admitted only to impeach
witness with witness’s own statement).

A party can impeach a witness or declarant with that witness’s or
declarant’s own prior inconsistent statements. But a party cannot
impeach one witness with someone else’s out-of-court statement;
to do that would be to offer the non-witness’s statement for its
truth, which is a hearsay purpose.
Sweetney v. State, 423 Md. 610 (2011) (Murphy, J.) (trial
court properly precluded cross-examination of one police
officer with out-of-court statement made by another officer
in the same department, regarding search warrant “return”
which did not list item that witness testified was found).
As to Rule 5-806, cf. Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137 (2009)
(impeachment of a key, non-testifying declarant –whose
OCS has been admitted for its TOMA--by extrinsic
evidence of a prior bad act under Rule 5-608(b) must be
allowed, if it would be permitted if the declarant had
testified at trial).
ii. Under certain circumstances the testimony of a witness or outof-court declarant may be rehabilitated by proof that that person’s
prior statements were consistent with his trial testimony. Rule
5-616(c)(2).
See Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412 (1998) (Chasanow, J.)
(use for this purpose may be permitted when substantive
use under Rule 5-802.1(c) is not).
2.

Statements that depend, for their relevance, on the declarant’s having
been sincere, but not on his/her having been factually accurate, are
also not offered for TOMA. Here the OCS is offered for a nonhearsay
purpose, as circumstantial evidence to prove the declarant’s emotion,
state of mind, knowledge, belief, intent, sanity, affection, ill will, etc.,
which is a relevant issue in the case.
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575-80 (2007) (Raker, J.)
(evidence of defendant’s initial refusal to provide a blood sample
was properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of consciousness
13

of guilt, as State had laid proper foundation by showing that
defendant was told blood was needed in reference to victim’s
health); Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532 (1998) (C. Moylan,
J.).
Example: In A’s trial for murder of B, the State offers, as relevant to A’s
motive or intent, C’s testimony that A said to C a week before the murder,
“B is a mean, nasty, rotten so-and-so.”
How is this evidence relevant to the State’s case? Is it relevant only if A
was correct as to the facts A asserted, i.e., that B was really mean, nasty,
etc?
No. It will be probative simply if the declarant A believed that the fact he
asserted was true: here, that B was nasty, etc., even if A is sadly mistaken
about B. The evidence may properly be admitted for a nonhearsay
purpose, as circumstantial evidence that A disliked B, which is relevant to
A’s motive and intent. The evidence would help to prove the fact it is
offered at trial to prove, even if A was factually wrong, and B was
really a kind and lovely person.
Now assume instead that the State calls C to testify to A’s OCS one week
before the murder, “I hate B.” This OCS is a direct assertion by A of A’s
state of mind, and is offered to prove that A was accurate, i.e., did have
the state of mind, i.e., A hated B. This OCS is offered to prove TOMA
and is hearsay (but it will be admissible under the state of mind hearsay
exception, Rule 5-803(b)(3)).
D.

Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the
Confrontation Clause
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause…does not bar
the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of
the matter asserted.”); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant’s
rights under the confrontation clause were not violated by the introduction of the
confession of an accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s
testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice’s
statement).

14

Chart 4 THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: IS THE HEARSAY
“TESTIMONIAL?”
Text of U.S. Constitution amend. VI: An accused has the right to confront “the witness”
against him or her. In pari materia: Md. Decl. of Rights art. 21.
I. HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT TO
CONFRONT) IF IT IS:
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
(1) Ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing; or
(2) A plea allocution; or
(3) Grand jury testimony; or
(4) Prior trial testimony; or
(5) “Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations…”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
In Crawford, the testimonial statements were made during a “structured, recorded”
interrogation at the police station, when the declarant and her husband were suspected of
having committed an assault.
Crawford focused on the historical context of the 6th Amendment: antipathy toward
“Bloody Mary’s” government’s gathering of formal solemn ex parte statements to be
used in criminal prosecution.
(6) Police “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime,
in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict), the perpetrator. The
product of such interrogations, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or
embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial.”
Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).
Both an affidavit signed by DV victim and her oral statements to police at the marital
home,
where her husband, Mr. Hammon, was in another room, with another officer, were
testimonial.
Davis’s companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). (J. Thomas dissented
as to Hammon facts.)

15

The Davis/Hammon Court looked at the “primary motive” (viewed
“objectively”) of the police/police agent, in asking the particular questions:
was it to resolve an ongoing emergency (yielding nontestimonial statements)
or to help to prove past criminal conduct/agency “some time after the events
described were over” (yielding testimonial statements)? and (2) the relative
degree of solemnity and formality of the interrogation. Both of these factors
were held to be relevant to what an objective declarant would take
to be the primary purpose of his or her statements.
Dictum: “volunteered testimony” in absence of interrogation would still be
testimonial.
(7) Notarized certificates by analysts of “a state laboratory required by law to
conduct chemical analysis upon police request” that a seized substance was cocaine
and how much it weighed.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (5 to 4 decision: dissent by J.
Kennedy, joined by C.J. Roberts, J.Breyer and J. Alito).
But dictum: “notice and demand” statutes are constitutional. Note: The State must
provide notice, e.g., under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-1001 through 10-1003 of a state
chemist’s report regarding a controlled substance before each trial, including retrials,
even where the defense had cross-examined the expert at the first trial. Harrod v. State,
423 Md. 24 (2011).
(8) In a case like #7, the witness subject to cross must be either the person who
performed or who witnessed the tests. (Here, the lab analyst who performed the tests,
and certified and signed the blood alcohol concentration results, had been put on unpaid
leave.)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (U.S. 2011) (same 4 dissenters as in
Melendez-Diaz) (J. Sotomayor concurred in part).
B. Maryland Cases
Statements To or By Agents of Police
(9) Statements of 8 and 10-year-old children in an interview by a social worker working
in tandem with and in presence of police officers, when child abuse had been reported
and the children had already accused defendant to the police.
Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 641 (2005) (Harrell, J.) (adopting test of “whether the
statements were made under circumstances that would lead an objective declarant
reasonably to believe that the statements would be available for use later at trial”).
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(10) Nontestifying co-defendant’s written and taped statements to police at the police
station.
Codefendant had made a “miscellaneous agreement” functionally equivalent to a guilty
plea agreement, that would become effective after defendant’s jury trial (unless the
codefendant made a successful motion for acquittal). Because the codefendant had
waived his right to actively participate in the trial, the trial court should have treated his
confession under Crawford, rather than simply under Bruton.
Morris v. State, 418 Md 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.).
(11) DV assault victim’s excited statements to responding police, where defendant
was known to be sitting on steps outside victim’s apartment and there were no
apparent severe injuries requiring immediate medical attention.
State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307 (2009), (Adkins, J.).
(12) Brock v. State, __Md. App.__n.5, 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9 2012) (D. Eyler, J.)
(State conceded that statements declarant made to police in months following
stabbings were testimonial).
Autopsy Reports [Is M.E. an Agent of Police?]
(13) “Opinions, speculation and other conclusions drawn [in autopsy reports] from
the objective findings in autopsy reports” are testimonial.
Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006) (Greene, J.). Accord Costley v. State, 175 Md. App.
90 (2007).
Lab Results
(14) Derr v. State, 422 Md. 211 (2011) (Greene, J.) held, relying on Bullcoming, that the
Confrontation Clause demands that either the analyst who performed DNA results
or a supervisor who observed it must testify at trial.
It thus held inadmissible a testifying expert’s testimony relying in part on the results
of another’s 2002 DNA analysis, when she had supervised only the subsequent
“matching” 2004 DNA analysis. Derr applied the same reasoning to the results obtained
by a serology examiner in 1985 regarding blood and semen at the time of the charged
rape.
J. Harrell, joined by J. Battaglia, concurred as to the testimony based on the 2002 DNA
analysis, but dissented as to the expert’s testimony relying on the 1985 serological
results, which they found to be merely “raw data” and different in several significant
ways from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.
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Note that the Fourth Circuit held the opposite way to Derr in United States v. Summers,
666 F. 3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011), and that the U.S. Supreme Court has heard argument on
this question in Williams v. Illinois.
Statements to and by Medical Personnel
(15) Report prepared by SAFE nurse employed by the Sexual Assault Center at Prince
George’s Hospital, where victim had been taken by police officer (who requested certain
tests) after victim had been examined and bandaged at another hospital; the 2nd hospital
performed forensic tests and prescribed antibiotics; report showed location of physical
injuries observed by SAFE nurse.
Green v. State, 199 Md. App. 386 (2011). .J. Salmon, joined by Kehoe and Hotten, JJ.,
distinguished autopsy reports prepared by M.E.’s, 199 Md. App. 403-04, but also rejected
the fact/opinion dichotomy created in Rollins.
N.b. The Confrontation Clause will not exclude, even if
testimonial HS:
(1) The accused’s own statement, or another’s adopted by
the accused (see Rule 5-803(a)(1)-(2)). Crawford; Cox v State,
421 Md. 630(2011) (Greene, J.); or
(2) Dying declarations (see Rule 5-804(b)(2)). Crawford n. 6.

II. HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED BY THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE) IF IT IS:
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
(1) Business records (generally) (see Rule 5-803(b)(6)); or
(2) “Casual remarks to an acquaintance” or overheard, off-the-cuff remarks; or
(3) Statements by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy (see
Rule 5-803(a)(5)); or
(4) Statements made “unwittingly” to an informant or undercover officer.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
(5) 911 call where a declarant reasonably would conclude that operator, as agent of
police,
“objectively” had “primary purpose” “to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.”
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Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).
Declarant-victim’s initial call in Davis was “plainly a call for help against a bona fide
physical threat”; victim’s responses were “frantic.”
(6) Dictum in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009): Merely routine
records kept in the ordinary course of business such as of routine maintenance of
equipment. Eg., United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742 (4th Cir. 2011) (Treasury
Enforcement Communications Systems records of vehicles crossing into the United
States and their license plates).
(7) Dictum in Melendez-Diaz: Certificates of authentication of a pre-existing official
document.
(8) Shooting victim’s statements in response to police’s questions, as victim
lay mortally wounded, outside a gas station.
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct.1143 (U.S. 2011) (over vehement dissent of J. Scalia and J.
Ginsburg).
Majority opinion by J. Sotomayor held that whether statements are testimonial is
determined by a multi-factor analysis, and the presence or absence of one factor is not
dispositive.
The factors include: (1) whether there seemed to be an ongoing emergency; (2) the
degree of formality of the interrogation; and (3) an objective evaluation of the
questions posed and answers given under all the circumstances in which the
declarant made the statements at issue.
As to factor (1), she noted that a deadly weapon had been used; the medical condition
of the victim (who here asked several times when medical help would arrive), and that
the “zone of
potential victims” was broader than in a domestic violence case.
Seemingly veering away from Crawford’s historical reasoning and back toward that of
Ohio v. Roberts’ focus on reliability, J. Sotomayor wrote: “implicit in Davis is the
idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose
of resolving that emergency is presumed significantly diminished, the Confrontation
Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of crossexamination.”
B. Maryland Cases
Statements to Police and Their Agents
(9) Dying declaration by victim, under facts similar to those in Michigan v. Bryant:
chaotic situation, and shooter’s whereabouts were unknown.
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Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006).
(10) DV victim’s excited utterances, imploring defendant to stop, heard by 911
operator over cell phone that had been left on during the assault.
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95 (2005) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 390 Md. 9
(2005).
(11) DV victim’s sobbing utterances in two 911 calls, requesting police and an
ambulance and describing defendant and his car (defendant hung up phone the first time;
the second time victim says he has left but she knows he is coming back).
Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110 (2009) (Alpert, J.).
(12) 911 call reporting license tag numbers and color of car in which shooter had
just fled after leaving carry-out where shooting occurred; caller noted that she was not
summoning the police: they were already on the way).
Langley v. State, 421 Md. 560 (2011) (4 to 3 decision) (Harrell, J.) (majority relied on
Bryant; C.J. Bell and JJ. Greene and Eldridge dissented).
(13) Several excited utterances made by declarant while pacing back and forth, to
responding police officer’s questions; declarant had himself been stabbed, while
trying to prevent flight of assailant who had fatally stabbed declarant’s friend at a
crowded tavern. When officer arrived, both victims were bleeding, and assailant’s
whereabouts were unknown. Officer called for medical assistance twice, and testified it
took the police about 30 minutes to secure the tavern and make sure the suspect was not
still there. Weapon was a knife. Not a domestic violence case.
“Viewed objectively, the total circumstances…make clear that ‘the primary
purpose’ of the officer’s questioning…was to meet an ongoing emergency.”
Brock v. State, __Md. App__ , 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9, 2012) (D. Eyler, J.).
Statements to Medical Personnel
(14) Statements by injured child to nurse examining him when admitting him to
pediatric ward, describing who had harmed him, even though child had been brought to
emergency room by police, who were questioning defendant.
Griner v. State, 168 Md. App. 714 (2006) (Salmon, J.).
Casual Remarks
(15) Casual remarks made by one inmate to another, describing the alleged crime.
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Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (noting similarity of facts to those of
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, (1970)). See id. at 650.
“We hold that when the State seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement against a
criminal defendant, the proper inquiry under Crawford and Bryant is to determine
whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s situation would have made the
statement ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.’ Bryant, 562 U.S. at __,131 S. Ct. at 1155.”
Parts of Autopsy Reports
(16) “[R]outine, descriptive and not analytical, [but] objectively ascertained and
generally reliable facts” in autopsy reports are nontestimonial; the recording of them is
required by Md. Health Gen. §5-311.
Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006).
This portion of Rollins is arguably implicitly overruled by Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming. See Derr v. State, 422 Md. 211 (2011); Green v. State, 199 Md. App. 386
(2011).
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Chart 5 DID THE ACCUSED “FORFEIT” HIS OR HER CONFRONTATION RIGHT?

Is the out-of-court Declarant unavailable to
testify now?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did “wrongdoing” cause that unavailability?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did the Accused commit (participate in, authorize or
conspire to do)No;forfeiture.
the wrongdoing?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did the Accused do that with the intention to prevent
.
the Declarant
from testifying?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes
The Defendant has lost the right to confront the
Declarant and cannot complain about the admission
of the Declarant’s testimonial OCS’s.
Authority: Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). N.b. not only dicta in majority opinion
(Scalia) but also clearly the partial concurrence (Souter & Ginsburg) and the dissent (Breyer,
Stevens & Kennedy) leave the door open for finding such intent upon proof of an intent to
“isolate the victum and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities.”
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Chart 6 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND RELATED ISSUES
A. OCS’S Within OCS’s : Rule 5-805
When evidence contains OCS’s by more than one declarant, each OCS must be
evaluated. If there is more than one “level” of evidence, i.e., we are asked to rely on one
OCS to prove another OCS made earlier, then we can’t get to the earlier OCS unless the
more recent one is admissible (either as nonhearsay or hearsay falling within a hearsay
exception). See Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101 (2004) (one level of OCS was
nonhearsay and the other was hearsay falling within an exception), rev’d on other
grounds, 385 Md. 165 (2005); State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178 (2001) (Hollander, J.).
B. Hearsay Exceptions that Are Applicable Only if the Declarant Testifies at Trial and is
Subject to Cross-Examination: Rule 5-802.1
N.b: The hearsay may be proved by the testimony of someone other than the declarant,
as long as the prerequisites of the Rule are met.
1. Rule 5-802.1(a): A subcategory of a testifying witness’s prior inconsistent
statements (“Nance statements”).
The required foundation:
a. The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement; and
b. If this requirement is met, then Rule 5-802.1(a) permits substantive use of a
witness’s prior inconsistent statements if they are either:
(1) written and signed; or
(2) stenographically or electronically recorded; or
(3) made under oath at deposition, trial, or in a hearing or another proceeding,
including a grand jury proceeding.
E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.)(recanting
witness’s prior inconsistent, audio recorded statement to police was properly
admitted by J. Glynn), cert. denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011).
2. Rule 5-802.1(b): A Subcategory of a Testifying Witness’s Prior
Consistent Statements
The required foundation:
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a. Witness must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement”;
b.

Prior statement must be consistent with witness’s testimony at trial;

c. Prior statement must be “offered to rebut an expressed or implied charge
against the declarant of fabrication, or improper influence or motive;” and
d. Prior statement must precede the alleged improper influence or motive to be
admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 5-802.1(b). Holmes v. State,
350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (Chasanow, J.); Thomas v. State, 202 Md.
App. 386 (2011) (Raker, J.).
3. Rule 5-802.1(c): The Witness’s Prior Identification of a Person (at a Line-Up,
etc.)
E.g.,Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.) (finding
evidence of identification at photo array by recanting witness admissible), cert.
denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011).
N.b.: Due process issue arises only if state action has made the circumstances
unduly suggestive. Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 146, 151- 63 (2010) (C.
Moylan, J.), cert denied, 418 Md. 192 (2011). Accord Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S.Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012).
4. Rule 5-802.1(d): Prompt Report of Sexual Assault, Consistent with Declarant’s
Trial Testimony
Required foundation:
a. Witness must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement”;
b. Prior statement must be consistent with witness’s testimony at trial;
c. Prior statement must have been a victim’s “prompt complaint of sexually
assaultive behavior.” See Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402 (2001) (C.
Moylan, J.) (13-year old girl’s statement to her 11-year-old sister, made
shortly after defendant left their apartment, that defendant had raped her,
qualified for admission under Rule 5-802.1(d); victim’s statements a day later
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to her school counselor and to a nurse-sexual assault examiner would likely
also have qualified but no objections to them were preserved).
d. These are admissible in both civil and criminal cases.
5. Rule 802.1(e): Recorded Recollection…
6. “Tender Years” Exception, Md. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. § 11-304, amended
effective October 1, 2011
Changes made:
1. The statute applies to child victims under the age of 13 at the time of the OCS,
rather than only under 12.
2. It adds to the categories of potential witnesses who can testify to the child’s
statement:
a. a counselor licensed or certified in accordance with Md. Code Ann.,
Health Occ. tit. 17; and
b. a therapist licensed or certified in accordance with Md. Code Ann.
Health Occ. tit. 17.
3. In a criminal proceeding or in a juvenile proceeding other than a CINA
proceeding, the child victim must testify at the proceeding.
4. The prosecution must give pretrial notice not only of the State’s intention to
introduce the child’s out-of-court statement, but also must provide to the
defense any audio or visual record of the statement or, if there is no such
recording, the content of the statement.
5. In making its determination as to the admissibility of the child’s statement, the
court may find that a recording of the statement makes it unnecessary for the
judge to examine the child victim.
C. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Regardless Whether the Declarant is
Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and Regardless Whether the Declarant
Testifies or Not
These OCS’s may be proved by the declarant’s own testimony to his or her OCS or
by the testimony of any other witness having first-hand knowledge of the OCS.
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1. Rule 5-803(a), Statement by Party-Opponent: Opposing party’s own, adopted,
authorized, agent’s, or a co-conspirator’s (often referred to as “admissions”) of a
party-opponent.
a. Any such statement offered by one party, against the opposing party who
made the adopted, etc. statement will not be excluded by the hearsay rule.
b. The phrase “admission against interest,” found in some case law, is a
misleading, mythological creature. Unlike under Rule 5-804(b)(3)
(“declaration against interest” by a now unavailable declarant), under Rule 5803(a) there is no requirement that the OCS or “admission of a party
opponent” have been disserving to the declarant at the time it was made.
c. Rule 5-803(a)(1): Statement of party opponent by that party himself
Flight Evidence: State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 56-59 (2011) (Adkins, J.) (error to
have given “flight” instruction to jury when evidence showed only that defendant
left scene of crime and took various steps to avoid being apprehended: these steps
did not amount to “flight”).
Song Lyrics: Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339 (2011) (Murphy, J.) held that the
trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to admit on
cross-examination, after the alleged shooter-defendant had testified that he had no
access to handguns and had never held one, the defendant’s drawing of a gun and
ten rap lyrics he had written about guns and shootings.
The appellate court distinguished inadmissible works of fiction from possibly
admissible autobiographical statements of historical fact. It found that the
evidence in this case lacked the special relevance needed to make it admissible
under Rule 5-404(b), and amounted to mere propensity evidence as to violence.
Finally, the door had not been opened by defendant’s direct examination.
d. Rule 5-803(a)(2): Adoptive Admissions
(i) Defendant adopted alleged coconspirator’s statements to a fellow inmate by
standing by and adding details. Cox v. State, 194 Md. App. 629 (2010) (Graeff,
J.) (affirming J. Watts), aff’d, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (Court of Appeals
did not reach this issue: see n.4).
(ii) State’s plea agreement with a witness that the witness would testify truthfully
did not make that witness’s actual testimony at trial of a likely codefendant
admissible as an adoptive admission by the State in the subsequent trial of the
defendant. Defense was permitted to call witness, but not to prove plea
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agreement. Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.), cert.
denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011).
(iii)Tacit Admissions (by Silence: A person’s silence in the face of another’s
statement can be interpreted as asquiescence in the truth of (adoption by silence
of) the other’s statement when three conditions are met:
(1)The party-opponent (or party’s agent, etc.) heard the other’s statement;
(2)The circumstances allowed for the party-opponent (or agent, etc.) to reply; and
(3)Under the circumstances, ordinarily a person similarly situated who was in
disagreement would “speak up” and correct the speaker.
These preliminary facts regarding tacit admission (and other adoptive admissions
also addressed by Rule 5-803(a)(2)) fall under Rule 5-104(b). If a reasonable
jury could find them to be met, the judge should admit the evidence (subject to
Rule 5-403).
2.

Rule 5-803(b): Exceptions that Apply Whether or Not the Declarant
Testifies at Trial
a. Rule 5-803(b)(1), Present sense impressions: a very small window of time.
Foundation elements:
(i)

The OCS was made while the declarant was perceiving the
event, or immediately afterwards; and

(ii)

The OCS merely describes or explains the event.

b. Rule 5-803(b)(2), Excited utterances: a bigger window, as long as the
declarant was still so upset by the event that s/he was not thinking before
speaking, so as to be able to fabricate a self-serving statement.
Foundation elements:
(i)

a startling event occurred;

(ii) OCS was made while the declarant remained under such stress
that s/he could not stop to think (and thus to fabricate a self-serving
statement) (look at all the relevant circumstances, including declarant’s
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emotional state, time lapse, and whether leading questions were asked);
and
(iii) The OCS relates to the starting event.
Witness, such as police officer, must lay foundation: describe affect of
declarant; time lapse; questions asked, if any; other evidence of starting
event, injuries, etc.
c.

Rule 5-803(b)(3), Statements by declarant as to his or her present
state of mind or physical condition: Declarant’s assertions of his or her
then-existing state of mind or physical condition (nonhearsay if not
offered for TOMA, but admissible hearsay under Rule 5-803(b)(3) if
offered for TOMA of the accused’s asserted state of mind, rather than to
prove a fact remembered or believed by the declarant). See Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).

Rule 5-803(b)(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), offered to prove the declarant’s then existing condition or the declarant’s future
action, but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant’s will.

Declarant’s OCS as to his/her state of mind existing at time of OCS is:
(i) Admissible to show declarant’s state of mind, when relevant.
See Edery v. Edery, 193 Md. App. 215 (2010) (Meredith, J.)
(decedent’s statements that she wanted to be buried in Israel
were improperly excluded when offered to show her wishes).
Ex.Victim’s statements of her fear of the defendant, made before her
murder, and a domestic violence protective order that prohibited the
defendant from entering the victim’s home, admissible as relevant to
defense raised that victim had invited defendant into her home, and

28

gun went off accidentally. Case v. State, 188 Md. App. 279 (1997)
(Murphy, J.).
(ii) Admissible to show declarant’s subsequent action, after the
statement, in accordance with stated intent. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
Ex. “I’m going to skip school tomorrow,” admissible to show
declarant played hooky the next day.
See Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 27-31, (2007) (C. Moylan,
J.) (Hillmon analysis inapplicable when no contention that declarant
subsequently acted in accord with stated intent), aff’d, 430 Md. 392
(2008).
In Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (2011) (Rodowsky, J.) where
the critical issue was whether the defendant had shot the victim
or the victim had committed suicide, it was reversible error to
admit State’s evidence tending to show that the victim was not
depressed, but to exclude testimony of a trooper --who had
arrested the victim for DWI one month before the victim’s
death-- that the victim appeared to be depressed, stressed about
the situation, and that the victim said to trooper, “This is the
last thing I need in my life right now on top of all the…other
shit going on in my life.”
The Court of Appeals did not analyze whether the OCS was offered
for TOMA. The OCS could have been relevant just to show that was
how the victim felt, not that a lot really was going on in the victim’s
life, in which case it would have been admissible as nonhearsay.
(iii) But inadmissible (under this hearsay exception) to show
something that occurred prior to the statement, that caused
declarant to have the particular state of mind. Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
Ex. “I hate Phil because he hits me and breaks my toys.” Admissible
to show that declarant hates/dislikes Phil, if that is relevant to the case;
inadmissible to show that Phil has hit the declarant.
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d.

Rule 5-803(b)(4), Statement of past or present facts, made while
seeking medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of possible
treatment.

Rule 5-803(b)(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of
treatment.

Required foundation:
(i) OCS made by person seeking medical treatment, should medical
treatment become necessary; and
(ii) Declarant knew that OCS would be relied on for possible
treatment. (This is the circumstantial guarantee of sincerity.)
If a patient is a child, it is particularly important that the doctor or
nurse explains to the patient (or other declarant, e.g., parent) that
what is said by the patient (or other declarant) will determine
treatment. See State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008) (Greene, J.)
(reversible error to admit evidence); Low v. State, 119 Md. 413 (1998)
(Thieme and Byrnes, JJ.).
(iii) Only the facts related in the OCS that are reasonably pertinent to
medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment will be
properly admissible.
Query:
Can the identification of the person who causes injuries ever be
pertinent to medical treatment and thus admissible under 5-803(b)(4)?
Yes, e.g., to identify poison given;, and thus the proper antidote.
If child abuse, “not ordinarily.” State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131
(2008) (Greene, J.), affg 175 Md. App. 588 (2002) (Hollander,
J.) (it was known at time of OCS that child no longer had any
contact with its perpetrator). But see In re Rachel T., 77 Md.
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App. 20, 33-36 (1988) (yes, due to possible testing for STD;
possible removal from home).
A number of federal cases hold that relevance to psychological
treatment, because of abuse, is sufficient.
e. Rule 5-803(b)(6)-(23)…Another day!
f.

Rule 5-803(b)(24), the “catch-all” exception
Brock v. State, ___ Md. App. ____, 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9,
2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (trial court properly excluded unavailable
declarant’s OCS—recanting prior statements identifying
defendant to police-- when offered by defense for TOMA;
finding also that defense barely preserved the issue of whether
the OCS was admissible to impeach the declarant under Rule
5-806, the court held that exclusion of the OCS was harmless
error, in light of the other evidence in the case, where the OCS
offered by State did not directly identify defendant).

D. Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown, under
Rule 5-804(a), to be Unavailable to Testify
1.

Rule 5-804(b)(1), Prior testimony now offered against a party who had
an opportunity and similar motive to examine the declarant at the earlier
proceeding.
In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670 (2010) (Raker, J.), the State had violated its
discovery obligation under Rule 4-263(d), when it had not disclosed impeaching
information known to a police officer that came to light after the first trial: that a
key eye witness had said she was “legally blind.” The eyewitness died before the
retrial.
The second trial judge admitted the witness’s videotaped testimony along with
medical records about her vision and the detective’s testimony that she had told
him she was legally blind. The Court of Appeals’ majority found these steps an
inadequate substitute for the ability to cross-examine the eyewitness. It concluded
that: “On remand, if the State wishes to introduce portions of the previously
recorded testimony, the trial court should redact any portion which relates to what
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she might have seen or testimony depending upon her vision.” Judge Murphy,
joined by Judge Rodowsky, dissented.
2. Rule 5-804(b)(2), Dying declarations.
See Head v. State, Chart 4.
3.

Rule 5-804(b)(3), Statements against interest.
The Court of Appeals amended Rule 5-804(b)(3), effective January 1, 2011, so as to
parallel the corollary amendment of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The rule now makes it
clear that whenever a statement against interest is offered “in a criminal case” under
this hearsay exception, the requirement that “corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement” applies.
The earlier language restricting the application of this requirement to statements
offered to “exculpate the accused,” see Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 (2002) (Cathell,
J.), has been deleted.

4.

Rule 5-804(b)(4), Statements of personal or family history, such as lineage.

5. The forfeiture by wrongdoing exceptions: Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) (civil); Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-901 (certain criminal cases only).
Both rules restrict the types of statements potentially admissible to only recorded or
written and signed statements (the same types that are also potentially substantively
admissible prior inconsistent statements under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a), when the
declarant testifies at trial). They also impose a notice requirement on the party
seeking to offer evidence under the forfeiture exception.
The criminal statute foregoes the usual preliminary fact standards of Rule 5-104(a)
and instead requires: (1) proof “by clear and convincing evidence that the party
against whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit
the wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the declarant”; and (2) that the
rules of evidence are “strictly applied” by the court in making this determination.
The criminal statute applies only in trials for certain crimes (generally, crimes of
violence and drug crimes).
E. Issues Related to Witness Intimidation
1.

Partial Closure of Courtroom Due to Suspected Witness Intimidation by
Particular Spectators
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Longus v State, 416 Md. 433 (2010) (Greene, J.) (violation of defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to public trial was reversible error; State’s proffer
of witness intimidation was inadequate to support exclusion from
courtroom of two spectators, when there was neither specific showing that
they had threatened the witness nor a voir dire of the witness, and the
defense was not given an opportunity to respond to State’s proffer) (note
that, although J. Greene authored the plurality opinion, four judges and
thus the court’s majority – J. Harrell, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, and J. Murphy, joined by J. Battaglia and J. Adkins, applied the
“substantial reason” test for justification of partial closure rather than the
“overriding interest’ test applied by J. Greene).
2.

Safety and Anonymity of Jurors
By a Rules Order effective September 1, 2011, the Court of Appeals adopted
new rules permitting a trial judge, who determines that juror safety or possible
harassment or tampering is a concern, to protect the identity of jurors by having
them referred to only by number rather than by name. Md. Rule 4-312(c) .

F. Authentication of Internet and Cell Phone Evidence
1.

Social Media
Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011) (Battaglia, J.) (finding inadequate
authentication of MySpace profile and posting as coming from
defendant’s girlfriend despite circumstantial evidence). JJ. Harrell and
Murphy dissented.

2.

E-Mails, I-M’s, and Text Messages
Dictum in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 361 n. 13 (2011) (“We further
note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging
correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those
involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because such
correspondences [sic] is sent directly from one party to an intended
recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to see.”).
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3.

Cell Phone Calls
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 225-30 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (both
direct and circumstantial evidence properly authenticated sources of calls
missed and received by cell phone; expert information technology
evidence was not required).

G. “By the Way”
1.

Federal Rules Restyled
The U.S. Supreme Court approved a “restyled” version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which became effective December 1, 2011. The Committee notes
accompanying each restyled rule emphasize that no substantive change in the
rules is intended. The revisions are stylistic only and are meant to modernize and
clarify the language of the rules. The revised rules and their complete legislative
history may be found at
www.uscourts.gov/RulesandPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Overview.aspx.

2.

More Information
More information on Maryland and federal evidence law is included in McLain,
volumes 5, 6, and 6A of MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, which is
accessible on Westlaw as “[vol. no.] Maryland Evidence [sec. no.]” The section
numbers generally correlate with the root of the Md. Rule number, e.g., Md. Rule
5-103 is discussed at §§ 103:1 et seq. and can be pulled up as “5 Maryland
Evidence 103:1.” Volume 5 addresses the 100’s-400’s Rules; volume 6 covers
privileges through the 700’s rules; Volume 6A covers 800’s-1000’s, plus the parol
evidence rule at §1101:1.
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